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Abstract. Recently, Alomair et al. proposed the first Un-
Conditionally Secure mutual authentication protocol for low-
cost RFID systems(UCS-RFID). The security of the UCS-
RFID relies on five dynamic secret keys which are updated
at every protocol run using a fresh random number (nonce)
secretly transmitted from a reader to tags.
Our results show that, at the highest security level of the
protocol (security parameter= 256), inferring a nonce is feasi-
ble with the probability of 0.99 by eavesdropping(observing)
about 90 runs of the protocol. Finding a nonce enables a
passive attacker to recover all five secret keys of the protocol.
To do so, we propose a three-phase probabilistic approach
in this paper. Our attack recovers the secret keys with a
probability that increases by accessing more protocol runs.
We also show that tracing a tag using this protocol is also
possible even with less runs of the protocol.
Key Words: RFID, Authentication Protocol, Passive At-
tack.
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1 IN T R O D U C T I O N
As of today, RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) is referred to as
the next technological revolution after the Internet. A typical RFID
system involves a reader, a number of tags, which may range from the
battery-powered, to the low-cost ones with even no internal power, and
a database. RFID systems enable the identification of objects in various
environments. They can potentially be applied almost everywhere from
electronic passports[19, 20], contactless credit cards[18], to supply chain
management[21–23].
Keeping RFID systems secure is imperative, because they are vul-
nerable to a number of malicious attacks. For low-cost RFID systems,
security problems become much more challenging, as many traditional
security mechanisms are inefficient or even impossible due to resource
constraints. Some existing solutions utilize traditional cryptographic
primitives such as hash or encryption functions, which are often too
expensive to be implemented on low-cost RFID tags.
Another method of securing RFID systems has been the lightweight
approach. These solutions base themselves on mostly lightweight oper-
ations (e.g. bitwise or simple arithmetic operations) instead of more ex-
pensive cryptographic primitives. The HB-family(HB+,HB++, HB*,etc.)
[1–7] and the MAP-family(LMAP,EMAP,M2AP,etc)[8–10] authentica-
tion protocols, are some examples of this kind. However, proposed
lightweight protocols so far have been targeted to various successful
attacks and therefore, the search for a concrete lightweight solution for
authentication in low-cost RFID tags still continues.
Recently, Alomair et al. embarked on the notion of UnCondition-
ally Secure mutual authentication protocol for RFID systems (UCS-
RFID)[16]. UCS-RFID’s security relies mainly on the freshness of five
secret keys rather than the hardness of solving mathematical problems.
Freshness in the keys is guaranteed with a key updating phase at every
protocol run by means of a fresh random number (nonce). This nonce
is generated at the reader side due to low-cost tags constraints, and
delivered to the tag secretly. This allows the tags to benefit from the
functionalities of random numbers without the hardware to generate
them.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we present a three-phase proba-
bilistic passive attack against the UCS-RFID protocol to recover all the
secret keys in the protocol. Our attack is mainly based on a weakness
observed in the protocol(section 3). To put in a nutshell, the weakness
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implies that the more outputs we have from consecutive runs of the
protocol, the more knowledge we will obtain on the nonces in these
protocol runs. In other words, having more number of protocol run
outputs observed, we are able to determine some of the nonces (victim
nonces) with higher probability. It should be noted that this weakness
has also been tackled by the authors in [16]. Nevertheless we will show
that the security margin they expected from the protocol has been
overestimated. Finding the victim nonce in the protocol paves the way
toward adopting an attacking scenario to achieve all of the five secret
keys in the system.
Outline. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
section 2, we briefly describe the UCS-RFID protocol. In section 3 the
weakness of the protocol is investigated thoroughly. Section 4 and 5
describes our attacking scenario to recover the keys, and trace the tag
in the protocol. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.
2 DE S C R I P T I O N O F T H E UCS-RFID PR O TO C O L
The UCS-RFID authentication protocol consists of two phases: the
mutual authentication phase and the key updating phase. The former phase
mutually authenticates an RFID reader and a tag. In the latter phase
both the reader and the tag update their dynamic secret keys for next
protocol runs.
In this protocol, first the security parameter, N, is specified and a
2N-bit prime integer, p, is chosen. Then, each tag T is loaded with an
N-bit long identifier, A(0), and five secret keys, k(0)a , k
(0)
b , k
(0)
c , k
(0)
d and
k(0)u chosen independently and uniformly from Z2N ,Zp,Zp\{0},Z2N
and Zp\{0} respectively.
2 .1 NO TAT I O N S
- N: security parameter.
- p: a prime number in Z2N
- Ax, Bx,Cx, Dx: observable outputs of xth protocol run
- n = nl ||nr: random number in Z2N
- nl , nr: left and right half-nonces
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Specifications
- Public parameters: p, N.
- Secret parameters(shared between R and T): k(0)a , k
(0)
b , k
(0)
c , k
(0)
d , k
(0)
u .
Mutual Authentication Phase
(1) R⇒ T : Hello
(2) T ⇒ R : A(i)
(3) R⇒ T : B(i),C(i)
(4) T ⇒ R : D(i)
Fig. 1: ith run of the mutual authentication phase in the UCS-RFID protocol
2.2 MU T U A L AU T H E N T I C AT I O N PH A S E
Figure 1 shows one instance run of the mutual authentication phase
in the UCS-RFID protocol. The reader starts the interrogation with a
“Hello” message which is responded by tag’s dynamic identifier A(i).
The reader then looks up in the database for a set of five keys(ka, kb, kc, kd,
and ku) which corresponds to A(i). If this search is successful, it means
that the tag is authentic. Having the tag authenticated, the reader gener-
ates a 2N-bit random nonce n(i) uniformly drawn from Z∗p, calculates
messages B(i) , C(i) by (2),(3) and sends them to the tag.
A(i) ≡ n(i−1)l + k
(i)
a mod 2N (1)
B(i) ≡ n(i) + k(i)b mod p (2)
C(i) ≡ n(i) × k(i)c mod p (3)
The tag first checks the integrity of the received messages by (4):
(B(i) − k(i)b )× k
(i)
c ≡ C(i) mod p (4)
This check implies the authenticity of the reader as well. Then, the tag
extracts the nonce n(i) by (5.)
n(i) ≡ (B(i) − k(i)b ) mod p (5)
To conclude the mutual authentication phase, the tag transmits D(i) as
a receipt of obtaining n(i).
D(i) = n(i)l ⊕ k
(i)
d (6)
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2.3 KE Y UP D AT I N G PH A S E
After a successful mutual authentication, both the reader and the tag
update their keys and dynamic identifier (A(i)) for the next protocol
run.
k(i+1)a = n
(i)
r ⊕ k(i)a (7)
k(i+1)b ≡ k
(i)
u + (n(i) ⊕ k(i)b ) mod p (8)
k(i+1)c ≡ k(i)u × (n(i) ⊕ k(i)c ) mod p (9)
k(i+1)d = n
(i)
r ⊕ k(i)d (10)
k(i+1)u ≡ k(i)u × n(i) mod p (11)
A(i+1) ≡ n(i)l + k
(i+1)
a mod 2N (12)
It should be noted that the dynamic values have been proved to preserve
their properties of independency and uniformity after updating[16].
3 OB S E RVAT I O N
In this section, we shed more light on a weakness in the UCS-RFID
protocol which becomes the origin of our proposed attack presented in
the subsequent section. By xoring (7) and (10), we have:
ki+1a ⊕ ki+1d = kia ⊕ kid (13)
Equation (13) shows that the difference between ka and kd remains the
same for two consecutive runs of the protocol. This statement can also
be generalized for every r arbitrary run of the protocol the as following:
kr+1a ⊕ kr+1d = kra ⊕ krd = . . . = k0a ⊕ k0d = L (14)
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By using (14), for outputs A and D in m consecutive runs of the protocol,
we have:
A(i) ≡ n(i−1)l + k
(i)
a mod 2N (15)
D(i) = n(i)l ⊕ (k
(i)
a ⊕ L) (16)
A(i+1) ≡ n(i)l + (k
(i)
a ⊕ n(i)r ) mod 2N (17)
D(i+1) = n(i+1)l ⊕ (k
(i)
a ⊕ L⊕ n(i)r ) (18)
...
A(i+m−1) ≡ n(i+m−2)l + (k
(i)
a
i+m−2⊕
j=i
n(j)r ) mod 2N (19)
D(i+m−1) = n(i+m−1)l ⊕ (k
(i)
a ⊕ L
i+m−2⊕
j=i
n(j)r ) (20)
It is apparent that we have a set of 2m equations with 2m+ 2 variables.
These variables can be divided into two groups:
1. 2m half-nonces: n(i−1)l , . . . , n
(i+m−1)
l , n
(i)
r , . . . , n
(i+m−2)
r
2. L and k(i)a .
So, if we fix the value of variables L and k(i)a , we end up with 2m
equations and 2m half-nonce variables. This implies that the 2m half-
nonces can not be chosen independently and fulfil the above equations
simultaneously. In other words, if we observe the outputs of m consecu-
tive runs of the protocol, it is only necessary to search over all possible
sequences of k(i)a and L, which is 22N , and then it will be possible to
find all 2m half-nonces uniquely. As we will see, this weakness is the
result of introduction of a tighter bound for the half-nonces while we
keep observing more runs of the protocol.
By the randomness nature of the generated half-nonces, the total
number of possible sequences for them(22N) is uniformly distributed
over them. This implies that each of the 2m half-nonces is expected
to have a bound of 2m
√
22N possible values (comparing to its previous
bound which was N). Therefore, for m consecutive protocol runs, the
total number of possible values distributed over the 2m half-nonces is
2m 2m
√
22N [16].
Now, if we exclude the value which half-nonces has taken already
(2m 2m
√
22N − 2m), we can calculate the probability that at least one half-
nonce does not receive another possible value (remains constant). To do
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Fig. 2: The number of consecutive protocol runs an adversary must observe(m) in order
to infer at least one half-nonce for N = 128, 256
so, we utilize the well-known problem in probability theory(i.e. Given r
balls thrown uniformly at random at b bins, the probability that at least
one bin remains empty which is calculated by (21))[17]:
Pr(at least one bin remains empty) = 1− (
r−1
b−1)
(b+r−1b−1 )
(21)
Now, it only requires to substitute b = 2m and r = 2m. 2m
√
22N − 2m in
(21) and then we will have (22). The result is plotted in Figure 2.
Ph = Pr(at least one half-nonce remains constant) = 1−
(2m.
2m√22N−2m−1
2m−1 )
(2m.
2m√22N−1
2m−1 )
(22)
Figure 2 shows the probability of inferring at least one half-nonce in
terms of the number of consecutive runs of the protocol required to be
observed to do so. For example, if we observe 35 runs of the protocol
runs with N=256, we will be able to determine at least one of the 70
transmitted half-nonces with the probability of more than 0.99.
We will use the term "victim half-nonce” for inferred half-nonce and
notation mh instead of m for the number of consecutive runs of the
protocol required to infer one half-nonce hereafter.
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4 OU R AT TA C K SC E N A R I O
In the previous section, we presented a probabilistic approach to find
the number of consecutive runs of the protocol to infer one half-nonce.
But in our attack, we need to have a complete nonce(left and right
corresponding half-nonces) to recover all secret keys. To achieve this
goal, we propose an attacking scenario which consists of the three
following phases:
1. Finding the total number of necessary consecutive runs of the
protocol to find a complete victim nonce (mt).
2. Finding the victim nonce.
3. Recovering the secret keys.
4 .1 PH A S E I : F I N D I N G mt
In section 3, we proposed a probabilistic way to calculate the number
of consecutive runs that must be observed by an adversary to infer a
half-nonce(mh). It is obvious that if we keep observing more runs of
the protocol(i.e. more than mh), after each extra observation, another
half-nonce can be inferred. This is simply possible by eliminating the
two equations which contain the first victim half-nonce and adding two
newly observed equations to the set of equations (15-20) and then, we
again have 2mh equations and 2mh + 2 variables which yield another
half-nonce inference.
If we intend to find a complete nonce, we must continue observing
the runs of the protocol until we infer two corresponding victim half-
nonces to form a complete nonce. To do so, we should first calculate
the probability that the inferred half-nonce at (me +mh)th run matches
one of the previously victim half-nonces.
As we know, after mh runs of the protocol, we accomplish to find
one victim half-nonce, after me extra runs of the protocol, we have
β = 2mh + 2me equations and β half-nonces which me + 1 of them can
be inferred. The probability that none of these me + 1 half-nonces match
is:
Pr(Having no pair after mh +me runs) =
(β− 1)
β
× . . .× (β−me)
β
=
∏mei=1(β− i)
β(me)
(23)
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Consequently, the probability of having at least one pair after observing
me runs is simply calculated by (24).
Pe = Pr(Having at least one pair of matching half-nonces after mh +me runs)
= 1− ∏
me
i=1(β− i)
β(me)
(24)
By using (22) and (24) the total number of protocol runs to have at least
one complete victim nonce (mt = mh +me) can be calculated by (25)
and is plotted in Figure 3.
Pt = Pr(Having at least one complete nonce after mt runs)
= (Pe|mh = h)× Pr(mh = h) = (Pe|mh = h)× Ph(h) (25)
Remark The authors of [16] have also calculated mt by using some
other protocol outputs (B and C). Figure 3 compares our results with
what the authors "Expected”. This comparison has been conducted for
two different security parameters N=128,N=256 which are plotted on
the left and right respectively.
The results show that the security margin of the protocol in terms
of the number of consecutive runs that must be observed to infer one
nonce is less than what the designers of the protocol expected. In other
words, we need less number of protocol runs to infer at least one nonce.
For example a passive adversary is able to infer a complete nonce with
high probability of 0.99 by eavesdropping less that 60 and 90 runs of
the protocol for the key size of 128 and 256 bits respectively. These
numbers were expected to be 110 and 200 respectively.
4 .2 PH A S E I I : F I N D I N G T H E C O N S TA N T N O N C E
Having mh consecutive runs of the protocol observed, we have one
constant half-nonce or one half-nonce with only one possible value. In
order to find this half-nonce, we adopt the following algorithm.
Algorithm Inputs :A(i), . . . , A(i+mt−1), D(i), . . . , D(i+mt−1)
1. Determine a level of confidence(probability) for the final results.
2. Find the mh, mt related to the determined probability from Figures
1,2 respectively.
3. Calculate me = mt −mh
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Our Result Expected
Fig. 3: Comparison of expected security margin of the UCS-RFID protocol and our
results in terms of the number of consecutive protocol runs an adversary must
observe in order to infer at least one nonce.
4. Choose two random numbers from Z2N and assign them to L,k
(i)
a
respectively.
5. Find 2m nonces (n(i−1)l , . . . , n
(i+mh−1)
l , n
(i)
r , . . . , n
(i+mh−2)
r ) as fol-
lows.
Find n(i−1)l from (15) i.e. n
(i−1)
l ≡ A(i) − k
(i)
a mod 2N .
Find n(i) from (16) i.e. n(i)l = D
(i) ⊕ (k(i)a ⊕ L).
Find n(i)r from (17) i.e. n
(i)
r ≡ (A(i+1) − n(i)l mod 2N)⊕ k
(i)
a .
...
Find n(i+mh−2)r from (19) i.e. n
(i+mh−2)
r ≡ (A(i+mh−1)−n(i+mh−2)l mod 2N)⊕
(k(i)a
⊕i+mh−2
j=i n
(j)
r ).
Find n(i+mh−1)l from (20) i.e. n
(i+mh−1)
l = D
(i+mh−1) ⊕ (k(i)a ⊕
L)
⊕i+mh−2
j=i n
(j)
r .
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6. Repeat 4 and 5 as many times as we observe that only one half-
nonce keeps its value for all of the repetitions.
7. Save the constant(victim) half-nonce.
8. Observe another run of the protocol.
A(i+mh) ≡ n(i+mh−1)l + (k
(i)
a
⊕i+mh−1
j=i n
(j)
r ) mod 2N
D(i+mh) = n(i+mh)l ⊕ (k
(i)
a ⊕ L⊕i+mh−1j=i n(j)r ).
9. Replace the equations corresponding to the found victim half-
nonce with two newly observed equations in the equation set
(15-20).
10. Repeat 4,5,6,7,8 for me times.
11. Match two corresponding victim half-nonces(e.g. n(j)l , n
(j)
r ).
12. Output the victim nonce (n(j) = n(j)l ||n
(j)
r ).
4 .3 PH A S E I I I : KE Y RE C O V E RY
In the previous two phases of our attack, we accomplished to find a
complete victim nonce n(j) ,with a certain probability, by observing mt
consecutive runs of the protocol. Now, we present how an adversary is
able to recover all five secret keys of the protocol. To find k(j)a , k
(j)
b , k
(j)
c
and k(j)d , we should follow(26-29).
k(j)a ≡ (A(j+1) − n(j)l )⊕ n
(j)
r mod 2N (26)
k(j)b ≡ B(j) − n(j) mod p (27)
k(j)c ≡ ( 1n(j) mod p)× C
(j) mod p (28)
k(j)d = n
(j)
l ⊕ D(j) (29)
To recover k(j)u , we need to find the nonce in the next run (n(j+1)), thus
we should calculate the updated keys for the (j+ 1)th run using (7) and
(10).
k(j+1)a = k
(j)
a ⊕ n(j)r (30)
k(j+1)d = k
(j)
d ⊕ n
(j)
r (31)
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Then we have:
n(j+1)l = D
(j+1) ⊕ k(j+1)d (32)
k(j+2)a = A(j+2) ⊕ n(j+1)l (33)
Using (30) and (33), we can write:
n(j+1)r = k
(j+2)
a ⊕ k(j+1)a (34)
Finally, by using (27),(32) and,(34) we can find k(j)u .
k(j)u ≡ B(j+1) − n(j+1) − (k(j)b ⊕ n(j+1)) mod p (35)
The procedure above provides us with our objective to recover all of
the secret keys with a certain probability(Pt). This probability can be
increased by paying the price of having more protocol run outputs
available.
Furthermore, as it can be seen from the (32) and (34), next nonce is
also achievable. This implies that the secret keys of the next run can
also be calculated by using (26-35) for the next run. This is an ongoing
procedure which yields the keys of any arbitrary run of the protocol(r)
which r > j. Being able to generate the future secret keys, an adversary
is capable of either impersonating both the reader and the tag or tracing
the tag.
5 ON T H E TR A C E A B I L I T Y O F T H E UCS-RFID
In the previous section, we presented a probabilistic key recovery attack
against the UCS-RFID protocol. We mentioned that according to Figure
3, we need to have about 90 runs of the protocol to be almost sure
that our found keys are correct. But with less number of protocol run
outputs, we still can apply an attack against the traceability of the
protocol. In this section, we formally investigate the untraceability of the
UCS-RFID based on the formal description in [11].
5 .1 AD V E R S A R I A L MO D E L
According to [11], the means that are accessible to an attacker are the
following: We denote a tag and a reader in ith run of the protocol by Ti
and Ri, respectively.
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• Query(Ti,m1,m3): This query models the attacker A sending a
message m1 to the tag and sending the m3 after receiving the
response.
• Send(Ri,m2): This query models the attacker A sending a mes-
sage m2 to the Reader and being acknowledged.
• Execute(Ti,Ri): This query models the attacker A executing a run
of protocol between the Tag and Reader to obtain the exchanged
messages.
• Reveal(Ti): This query models the attacker A obtaining the infor-
mation on the Tag’s memory.
A Passive Adversary, AP , is capable of eavesdropping all communica-
tions between a tag and a reader and accesses only to the Execute(Ti,Ri):
.
5 .2 AT TA C K I N G UN T R A C E A B I L I T Y
The result of application of an oracle for a passive attackOP ⊆ {Execute(.)}
on a tag T in the run i is denoted by wi(T). Thus, a set of I protocol
run outputs, ΩI(T), is:
ΩI(T) = {wi(T)|i ∈ I} ; I ⊆ N;(N denotes the total set of protocol
runs).
The formal description of attacking scenario against untraceability of a
protocol is as following:
1. AP requests the Challenger to give her a target T.
2. AP chooses I and calls Oracle(T, I,OP ) where |I| ≤ lre f receives
ΩI(T).
3. AP requests the Challenger thus receiving her challenge T1, T2 ,I1and
I2
4. AP calls Oracle(T1, I1,OP ) , Oracle(T2, I2,OP ) then receives ΩI1(T1)
, ΩI2(T2).
5. AP decides which of T1 or T2 is T, then outputs her guess T´.
For a security parameter,k, if AdvUNTAP (k) = 2Pr(T´ = T)− 1 > e then
we can say that the protocol is traceable.
For UCS-RFID case, as Figure 3 implies, an adversary AP needs only
to access to about 40 and 65 consecutive runs of the protocol to be
able to determine n(j) with a probability of more than 0.5 (e.g. 0.6) for
k =128 and 256 respectively and then according to section 4.3, she will
97
Security Analysis Of Lightweight Schemes for RFID Systems
be able to recover the keys of subsequent runs. After, key recovery, the
adversary can easily distinguish a target tag with any other challenge
tag given by the challenger. So we have:
∀lre f ≥ 40, AdvUNTAP (128) = 2Pr(T´ = T)− 1 = 0.1 > e.
∀lre f ≥ 65,AdvUNTAP (256) = 2Pr(T´ = T)− 1 = 0.1 > e.
6 CO N C L U S I O N S
The design of suitable lightweight security protocols for low-cost RFID
tags is still a big challenge due to their severe constraints. Despite of
interesting proposals in the literature, this field still lacks a concrete
solution.
Recently, Alomair et al have proposed the first authentication protocol
based on the notion of unconditional security. Regardless of some
inefficiencies in UCS-RFID authentication protocol, such as: large key
sizes, using modular multiplication ,etc ,which makes this protocol an
unsuitable nominate for low-cost RFID tag deployment, we presented a
passive attack which showed that even the security margin which was
expected to be yielded by UCS-RFID has also been overestimated.
In our attack, we showed that a passive adversary is able to achieve
the all secret keys of the system with a high probability of 0.99 by
eavesdropping less that 60 and 90 runs of the protocol for the key size
of 128 and 256 bits respectively. Tracing the tag in the protocol is also
feasible even by less number of runs of the protocol (e.g. 40, 65).
Our results suggest a major rethink in the design of the authentication
protocols for RFID systems based on unconditional security notion.
Drastic changes are necessary to fulfil both technological constraints
and security concerns in RFID systems.
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